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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 24, 1943, the respondent insurance company
issued a life insurance policy to Neal Kellogg, which contained a provision for double indemnity in the event of
accidental death within the terms of the contract. Mr.
Kellogg was operated in August, 1944, for rupture duodenal ulcer and an impacted diseased appendix. He was
operated on October 12, 1945, for a ventral hernia
through the. site of the old incision, and the removal of
many adhesions between the bowel and the peritoneum.
He died October 13, 1945, from surgical shock. He was on
the operating table six hours. The insurance company has
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paid th~ face of the policy, but asserts if is not obligated
to pay the double inden1nity. It defends on the ground
that the death was not effected wholly by accidental
means, but resulted directly or indirectly from physical
infirmity or irlness or disease.
The trial court found in favor of the defendant:
"6. That on October 12, 1945 a surgical operation
was performed on the deceased, Neal J. Kellogg, at his
request, at Missoula, Montana, by Dr. W. Neil1\fcPhail,
and that on and prior to August 17, 1944, Neal J. Kellogg
was suffering from a stomach ulcer which ruptured on
said date, allowing a portion of the contents of his
stomach to escape into the peritoneal cavity, and that
on August 17, 1944, a surgical operation was performed
on Neal J. KeUogg at Missoula, Montana, by Dr. vV.
Neil McPhail, and that in said operation said ruptured
ulcer was repaired and the appendix of Neal J. Kellogg
was found to be impacted and diseased and it was removed by said surgeon with apparent normal results,
but thereafter, and as a result of the ruptured ulcer
and the operation perforri1ed by said surgeon to repair
said ruptured ulcer, the said Neal J. Kellogg developed a
postoperative hernia in the location of the incision for
the operation performed in 1944, and the said Neal J.
Kellogg developed and became afflicted with numerous
adhesions between his intestines and other tissues in his
abdomen, including the lining of the peritoneal cavity.
"7. That •the operation of October 12, 1945, was performed by Dr. McPhail for the purpose of re'lieving the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
pain and discon1fort which the said Neal J. Kellogg
was suffering by reason of the postoperative hernia
into the site of the first incision, having been examined
cmnpletely prior therto and to the examining physician
he appeared to be physically fit for such operation, and
when said doctor had opened up the peritoneal cavity,
he found that the said Neal J. Kellog had said adhesions
in his abdon1en and that said adhesions constituted a
~erious threat to the life of said Neal J. K·ellogg if not
repaired, and the said Dr. ~fcPhaii thereupon, in the
exercise of his skill as a surgeon, undertook to repair
and remove said adhesions.
'' 8. That the repair of said hernia and adhesions on
October 12, 1945 consumed approximately six hours, and
as a result of the operation which had been made neces.
sary by the prior rupturedulcer and prior surgery, said
~ eal J. Kellogg went into surgical shock anq died on
October 13, 1945, and that no accident or mishap occurred
at or during said surgery. His condition appeared to be
good immediately following the operation.
"9. That the death of said Neal J. Kellogg did not
occur as the result of bodily injury effected exclusiveiy
and wholly by external vidlent and accidental means.

"10. That the death of the said Neal J. Kellogg re.
suited directly or indirectly from physical infirmity or
illness or disease, to-wit : The ruptured ulcer of the stomach caused and made necessary the surgery in 1944
upon the body of the said Neal J. Kellogg, and said surSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
gery caused and made necessary the surgery of 194~,
which in turn caused the death of said Neal J. Kellogg."
The testimony in the record consists of the deposition of Dr. W. Neil l\fcPhail of Missoula, Montana,
who performed both operations, and Dr. Clark Young of
Salt Lake City, Utah.
Dr. McPhail testified that Kellogg had an ulcer of
the stomach which ruptured while Kellogg was in
Missoula in August, 1944. He operated on August 17,
1944, and found an impacted, diseased appendix which
was also removed.
The contents of the stomach had partiaHy emptied
into the peritoneal cavity and set up a general inflammation or peritonitis. The rupture of the ulcer and resulting
surgery caused numerous adhesions between the intestines and the peritoneal lining. 'The rupture of the ulcer
and the surgery which was necessary in order to save
Kellogg's life caused the adhesions·of the intestines and
the ventral hernia. The hernia made Kellogg constantly
uncomfortable and he was many times in pain from it.
( Tr. 22) If he did not have the second operation, he
would have to suffer the rest of his life, stay in bed, or
certainly not in an upright position at any time, and his
condition would preclude almost any a~tivity for
him. His life expectancy was extremely short - sitting
on a volcano the whole time. The bowel obstructions were
more serious and hazardous because of the ventral
hernia. The bowel at several points was practically
completely obstructed. The movement of the matter
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through the bowel was impaired. The bowel might at any
time becmne con1pletely obstructed. The operation could
not be delayed for long. In a short time there would have
been an obstruction.
The second operation for the relief of the ventral
hernia and the adhesions was performed on the 12th of
October, El-!5. Kellogg died on October 13, from postoperative shock. He was given sodium pentothal anesthesia together with some nitrous oxide or oxygen. He
was on the operating table from 11 :00 a.1n. until 5 :00
o'clock p.m. One of the causes of death was the time consunled in repairing the extensive adhesions of Kellogg's
intestines. (Tr. 27)
An inrmedia te cause of death was ventricular fibri'llation. That means the large heart muscle does not
contract - it just quivers. It is a worn out heart. (Tr.29)
The perforated duodenal ulcer was one of the contrib. .
utory causes of death. Another contributory cause was
the extensive and prolonged surgery made necessary by
the adhesions of the bowel. (Tr. 30) When Mr. Kellogg
went into surgical shock about 1:00 a.m. October 13,
1945, he was given heart stimulant, blood plasma, and
glucose in saline. He died at 1:00 p.m. He was 45 years
old.
There was nothing about the operation which was
unusua~ or out of the ordinary. His condition was good
immediately following the operation.
Dr. Young's testimony is briefly summarized as
follows:
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The doctor who operates expects a favorable result.
(Tr. 7) A six hour operation would certainly suggest the
fact that the patient might have a surgical shock. Six
hours is a very unusual time to be on the operating table.
(Tr. 9) Not being there I don't know whether a transfusion was indicated or not. Each case is different.
Otherwise it seemed that he used most every method that
he could. (To keep the patient alive) Post operative
shock resUlts from severe trauma on the sympathetic
nervous system, a,ilso loss of blood and bodily fluids. (Tr.
10 and 11) Ventricular fibrillation is the final spasm of
the heart muscle. The heart has to stop some way. Failure to give blood plasma may have been the right thing
to do. Ideas of what is proper in connection with surgery
change continually. Embolus is found ordinarily in a
week or ten c}ays after surgery. We now get them up
early to avoid clots. Except in extreme cases, the patient
is not expected to die from the surgery. The surgeon
does what he can to prepare the patient for surgery to
prevent shock. (Tr. 18) Usually he does not operate until he overcomes shock from prior accident. The operation on the ulcer produced the hernia and adhesions. The
initial link in the chain of cause and effect was the repair
of this ulcer. If a r"\}ptured ulcer is not operated, the person will die. The ruptured ulcer made the first operation
necessary. The first surgery caused the ventral hernia,
which made the second operation necessary. (Tr. 21)
The second operation caused death. (Tr. 22) Death from
such surgery is something that frequently occurs. Everything c:ombined makes a bad prognosis. ( Tr. 27)
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There was nothing unusual in the surgery itself.
There was no en1bolism, which is a clot of b~ood lodging
in the body and producing death. There was no slip of
the knife or any failure on the part of the surgeon to
exercise ordinary care in the service furnished the·
patient.
ARGU~IENT

·Appellant argues the case as if the appeal here involved were a new trial on the facts before this Court.
'Vhile there was no substantial conflict in the testimony
below, the Trial Court in making findings, conclusions
and judgment, was drawing ultimate facts and conclu:-;ions from the evidence.
''This being a law case, we do not determine
whether as a fact plaintiff was negligent, but only
whether or not the evidence sustains the finding
of the trial court to that effect.'' Erca;nbrack vs.
Ellison, et al, 103 U. 138, 34 P. 2d. 177.
The consideration of this case should begin with the
policy. It provides double indemnity if death occurred
as the result of bodily injury effected exclusively and
wholly by external, violent and accidental means, and that
such death occurred within 90 days after sustaining such
InJury.
The ''risks not covered'' provide the benefit shall
not be payable if the death results directly or indirectly
from physical infi.rmity, from illness or disease of any
kind.
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The 1nost recent Utah case invo1ving accidental
death is Tucker vs. New York Life Insurance Oompany,
155 P. 2d. 173, 107 Utah 478. The deceased, Garber 1\L
Nichols, fell on the sidewa1k on November 19, 1941, and
broke his arm. He had been a patient of Dr. Ralph T.
Richards from early in November, 1940. He died Decenlber 7, 1941, from a ruptured dissecting aneurysm of the
aorta. The circulatory disease had been present in l\fr.
Nichols for a year or more. This condition or disease was
active and progressive. The doctors expressed the belief ·
that the intima of the aorta gave way and caused death,
and this was the result of the diseased condition which
had so weakened this artery ·that it could not stand the increased blood pressure occasioned by the fall or the
strain imposed upon the aorta after the injury. The Supreme Court held the death was caused by an existing
disease which cooperated with the accident in causing
death and therefore the trial court shou'ld have directed
the verdict for defendant. In the Kellogg case the ulcer of
the stomach is a disease or bodily infirmity which caused
the death.
The Utah Court in Bnownilng vs. Equit.able Life
Insurance C01npany, 94 U. 532, 72 P 2d 1060, said the
courts, in interpreting the clause, an injury through
accidental means independent of all other causes have
made three classes of cases: (1) When an accident causes
a diseased condition which together with the accident
results in the injury or death, the accident alone is considered. as the cause. (2) When at the time of the accident, the insured was suffering from some disease, but
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the disease had no causal connection with the injury or
death resulting from the accident, the accident is to/ be
eonsidered the sole cause. (3) When at the time of the
accident there was an existing disease which, cooperotimg
with the accident, resulted in the injury or death, the
accident cannot be considered as the sole eause or as the
eause independent of all other causes. (citing cases under
each category) The Tucker case followed the rule of the
Browning case.
One of the cases cited by the Utah Court is Smith vs.
Federal Insurance Cormpari!!J, 6 F. 2d 283, Smith assisted
in getting a car out of the mud and died the same evening
from acute n1yocarditis. The proof of death said "caused
by strain in lifting - contributory cause influenza several
weeks ago. '' The doctors expressed the opinion that
probably the influenza had weakened the heart, and that
the pushing of the automobile was a strain too great for
the weakened organ.
The court said:
''Where the insured, at the time he receives
the injury is suffering from a diseas·e, or defect,
which, acting with the injury, as a contributing
factor brings about the death, or when such existing disease or defect aggravates the effect of
the injury or the injury aggravates the effect of
the disease, and both acting together, cause the
death, the injury is not the sole cause of the
death." (citing cases)
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In the Tucker case the deceased (Nichols) had been
suffering from high blood pressure for at least a year
prior to his accidental fall. "He had been suffering
from a known disease for a period of a year or longer.
The condition of the disease was not on1y active but progressive.''
In Rapp vs. Mietropolitam Accident & Health Ins. Co.
8 N. W. 2d 692, (Nebraska 1943) the insured died of
surgical shock induced by an operation for an obstruction of the bile duct. Attempts were made to drain the
gall bladder n1echa!lically without success. He was taking
medicine including synkamin and 5% glucose. He was
itching and getting worse. \Vith a complete obstruction
the patient would eventually die. On April 30, ·he was
operated for exp1lora:tion. _'That morning his pulse and
respiration were normal and in the doctor's opinion he
would have withstood an operation. The duration of such
an oper'ation is from one hour to an hour and a half.
After the operation had been in progress about 37 minutes, the patient went into shock and died in about 30
minutes. An autopsy was performed.
"If one dies unexpectedly during a major
surgical operation, where there is no mishap, slip
or any unexpected, unusual or unforeseen occurrence, his death is not the result of accidenta·l
m·eans. In the instant case there was no accident
during the insured's exploratory major surgical
operation. 'True, no one expected insured to die
on the operating table, but an accidental death
does not depend upon what one expects will or
will not happen. Every one knows that there 1s
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

much uncertainty about what will or will not happen during a major surgical operation, if the patient is in a poor physical condition and if the
purpose of the operation is to explore in order to
prolong the life of the insured, who in this case
couid have died, as testified to by his attending
physician, on the afternoon of the day of the
operation, if surgical steps had not been taken in
an effort to prolong his life.''
"From the doctor's contact with the patient,
the treatment administered, the patient's reactions, the doctor's observations, the history found
by the doctor in the operation, and on the autopsy
which the doctor attended, it was his opinion that
the poor physical condition of the patient ·existing in the period of time through which he at~
tended him, co;used the surgical shock suffered
by the patient. This was due to severe damage to
the cells of the liver and its inability to detoxica:te
or break down the poisonous substances which are
put into it, thus lessening the resistance of all
the tissues, so the patient could not react as readily as he could have done at some previous period;
that is, it was the patient's general condition and
the condition of his tissues which caused his failure to respond to the stimulant. The patient did
not have sufficient strength or stamina to withstand the operation; it oaused the shock; it was
not am ,accident."
The Kellogg case is ruled by the Tucker case which
holds the accident was not the sole cause, but was assisted by a cooperating aneurysm, which is a disease or
bodily infirmity. There was no controversy about the
deceased sustaining an accident in the Tucker case. He
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fell and broke his leg. There was testimony this caused
the rupture of a weakened inner lining of the artery. But
th,e court held that because a pre-existing disease of the
artery had weakened it and thus cooperated as a cause
of death, there should be no recovery. In the Kel'logg
case the testimony is undisputed that the ruptured ulcer
was the first link in an unbroken chain of cause and
effect which finally produced death. (The ruptured
ulcer; the first operation; the post-operative hernia; and
adhesions of the bowel; ~the, second operation ; the death.)
Both the ruptured ulcer· and the adhesions and the
hernia cons~itute an infirmity or dis·ease which were
one of the efficient operating causes of death and thus
preclude recovery.
In W.eU.e vs. M etropolit,an Li-fe Insurance Oampany,
27 N.E. 2d 63, (Illinois 1940) the deceased had an ulcer of
the duodenum. He accidently slipped and fe'll thus causing a rupture of the ulcer. He had to undergo an operation for the ruptured ulcer and as a result of the operation he developed bronchial pneumonia from which he
died. The policy was substantially th~ same as the one
here involved. The court held the defendent was not
liable.
''The authorities cited by the app~llee are
distinguishable on an' important basis of fact from
the case at bar. The complaint in the present
case shows that the accidental injury was to a
diS'eased growth, which is an object foreign to
the normal body, namely, a duodenal ulcer. 'The
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co1nplaint alleges that the slipping and falling
of the insured acted upon this ulcer, causing it
to rupture and bring about the necessity· of an
operation, which caused his death. Had there been
no ulcer. there would have been no injury, as an
ulcer i~ not a part of a normal person's anatomy.
It is a disease or bodi·ly infirmity which develops
and gro"-s in son1e individuals, and is of itself, a
disease or bodily infirmity. !As was said in the
:Masonic Association vs. Shryock, supra, and
quoted with approval by us in Crandall v. Casualty Con1pany, supra, if at the time he sustained the
accident ·he was suffering from a pre-existing
disease or bodily infirmity, and the accident woUld
not have caused his death if he had not been affected with the disease or infirmity, but he died
because the accident aggravated the effects of
the disease, or the disease aggravated the effects
of the accident, the contract was that the insurance company, should not be liable for the amount
of his insurance. ''
An ulcer is a disease or boaily infirmity. When it
ruptures as Kellogg's did surgery is imperat~ve to save
the patient's life. Certainly, this ruptured ulcer was the
principal factor in Kellogg's death. It ·was a direct cause
of death. The parties contracted that if death results
directly or indirectly from physical infirmity or disease
of any kind the accidental benefits should not be payable.
The plaintiff has been paid all the benefits to which she
is entitled.
In Mu.tual Life lnsura;nce Co,. vs. Hassi:ng, 134 F. 2d
717 (C. C. A. 10th-1943), the facts and rule are shown
by the following quotation:
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''Here the evidence shows that the insured
approached the moving train. He stood on the
curb momentarily, turned and walked to the center of the street alongside the moving train where
he stopped and faced the train. While thus standing with both hands in his topcoat pockets, he
went down on one knee and under the moving
train-death resulted. Here the evidence stops,
and from that point the jury was required to
speculate on the cause of the fail. There is no
evidence or reasonable inferences from which
it can be said that the insured tripped, slipped,
was pushed, shoved, or otherwise impeHed under
the moving train. There is, we think, a reasonable
inference to be drawn from the evidence that the
insured's peculiar disease caused him to lose his
equilibrium and become overbalanced, as a result of which he fell headlong under the moving
train. Indeed, the facts seem to repel any other
reasonable inference. But it is not essential to a
verdict for the defendant that the evidence should
repei any other hypothesis than the one advanced
by it. It is incumbent upon plaintiff to take the
cas-e from without the realm of speculation, conjecture, and surmise, and to create a faetual basis
from which a reasonable inference can be drawn.
Failing in this, plaintiff cannot prevail. New
York ·Life Insurance Company v. Doerksen,
supra.
''In our opinion, the ·evidence fails to meet
that degree of proof which we hold is essential
to establish with any degree of certainty or probability that death was effected by accidental
n1eans, solely and exclusively of an other causes.
''The judgment is reversed.''
The Hassing cas·e arose in Utah and the court had
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quoted with approval the rule of the Utah case of Browning rs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94 Utah 570,
80 P. 2d, 348:
'• ~ ~ ~ 'If the accident or injury resulting in
the disability or loss was produced, caused, set
in Inotion or operation by disease or infirmity,
then it is indirectly caus·ed by such disease or infi.nnity ~ ~ ~ and not of accident.' "
The appellant relies upon the Handly case, Rwndly
'l'S. J!utual L·ife Insurance Company of N1ew York, 147 P.
2d 319. The lin1itation upon the rule in the Handly case
is shown b:~ the following portion of this decision. After
posing the question of whether "any and every unexpected resu1t of a technically correct op~ration is not an
accident" the court said:
'
''Perhaps so, but we need now go no further
than to say that where it clearly appears from the
evidence that the operation set in motion diefinit.e
particles of matter distmctly and directly traceable to the operation without which the, probability is that they would not have been g1evnerate•d
or set in motion and it specifioall;y appears that
the action of that substomce on ·a vital orgam
caused the death of the patient, such death was
directly caused by an injury effected by violent,
external and accidental means.''
If we test the facts in the Kellogg case by the limitation of the law in the Handley case, it is clear that the
rule of that case does not apply here. Kellogg did not
have any blood clot. His operation did not set in motion
definite particles .of ma.Uer which caused death. The
court in the Handley case refused to hold that any and
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every unexpected result of a technically correct operation is an accident:
It is interesting to point out that the death in the
Kellogg case was not entirely unexpected after the long
operation made necessary by the extensive adhesions.
Surely no court would hold that every death following
surgery is accidental unless the doctor who operated
is willing to testify that he expected the patient would
die as the result of surgery, and he had 'this expectation
when he began the operation. The on'ly expectation which
should be c'onsidered is that following the surgery Dr.
~fcPhail and Dr. Young recognized that the prognosis
for Kellogg was not very good after surgery. It is hard
to. believe that a workable rule can be established which
is based on nothing more substantial than the optimism
or pessimism of the surgeon.
One reaon why the Handley case is not in point is
because of the difference between surgical shock and
pulmonary embolism. Post operative shock results from
severe trauma on the sympathetic nervous system, a~so
loss of blood and bodily fluids. The wear and tear on the
system caused by surgery if too much for the resistance
and vitality of the patient will always produce surgical
shock. It is not something to which some patients have a
peculiar susceptibility like certain anesthesia as in the
"\Vhatcott case. True it is that som·e persons can stand
more pain or surgery than others without going into
shock, but that does not mean that a shock death following surgery is unexpected in the sense that a hyper-
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susceptibility to novocain is unexpected. This court
pointed out the reason why the pulmonary embolus in
the Handley case was an accident. The Ke'llogg death
falls outside the reason of the Handley case. The particles of matter set in motion by the operation in the
Handley case which caused death are absent in the Kellogg case.
Another reason for distinction between the 'cases is
the difference between the hernia from which Handley
was suffering and the condition of Kellogg when the
operation was performed from which he died. There was
no evidence in the Handley case that the hernia was a
cooperating cause of death. It is not sufficient to say
that the hernia was the cause of the operation. If Handley had suffered a pulmonary embolus from so_me minor
surgery for the removal of a wart or cyst, the embolus
would have been the so~e cause of death.
But Kellogg did not suffer any unexpected resultfrom the surgery except the death itself. He had no embolism. The ruptured ulcer and the extensive ab~ominal
adhesions which it produced, following the first operation, was a cooperating cause of death. Dr. McPhail
found such a mass of adhesions that the bowels were· almost comp~etely obstructed in a place or two, and the
repair of the ventral hernia together with the removal
and repair of the adhesions took six hours. ''A six hour
operation would certainly suggest the fact that the
patient might have a surgical shock.'' The death followed
as the natural result of the extensive surgery made
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necessary by the adhesions and the ventral hernia, which
had been brought on by the ruptured ulcer. The resistance and vitality of the patient was unable to pull him
through the extensive surgery made necessary by his extensive infirmities. It is impossible to picture the cause
of the death of Kellogg without including the extensive
adhesions, which had to be removed by surgery. It is
probable Handley's hernia had no relation to the death
other than the fact it made surgery advisable.
In n1aking this comparison we are not arguing that
there is a distinction between the case at bar and the
Handley case, because Handley had sustained an accidental hernia more than 90 days before death. We concede that an operative incision may constitute ''external,
violent and accidental means" depending on what the
result of the operation may be. If it results in a pulmonary embolus, it is accidental. Under the Handley
case, the means and the result are to be viewed as one
package. Appellant is asking the court to extend the
rule of pulmonary embolus to surgical shock from six
hours, of surgery to remove adhesions. No case has gone
that far. The Nebraska Court refused to hold death from
surgical shock accidental in the Rapp case. (supra) The
Appellate Court of Illinios in Ebbert vs. M etropoUtan
Lifie lnsur~anc;e Comparuy, 7 N. E. 2d. 336, held that death
during surgery for the removal of tonsils was not accidentat It appeared the insured was suffering from disease which contributed to his dea:th.
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The Handley case was decided on March 13, 1944. On
July 13, 19+±, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Preferred Acc·iden.t Tnsura.nce Co. rs Clark, 144 F.
:2d, 165. It is interesting to compare the two cases. The
Federal Court applied the New York rule, because it
was stipulated a New York contract was involved. The
dec.eased was operated on April 25, 1941, for the removal of the gall bladder and appendix and the drainage
of the co1nn1on bile duct. Following the operation, he
suffered an acute n1assive pu'lmonary collapse and died
24 hours after the operation. New York like Utah does
not recognize the distinction between ipsurance against
loss fron1 accidental means and loss from accidental result. The New York test is whether the average man,
under the existing facts and circumstances, would regard the loss so unforeseen, unexpected, and extraordinary that he would say it was an accident. The application of the rule seems to closely parallel the Utah
cases. (Sunstroke, infection from puncture of a pimple,
administration of morphine and atropine) However,
New York, has refused to foHow the rule announced to ·
a death by pulmonary embolism. (See Bennett vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 13 N.Y. S. 2d 540) The
New York Court said:
''Here, however, the death ensued as the
result of post operative pulmonary emboli~m.
In such event, the co1use was neither trivial nor the
result unforeseen.''
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The Tenth Circuit held the death from pulmonary
collapse following surgery by twenty-four hours was not
accidental:
''Excluding those cases where the condition
of the patient is desperate and an operation is
resorted to with the hope of possibly saving his
life, we know that death does not ordinarily result from a major abdominal operation. Yet we
also know that death does result from complications arising after major abdominal operations
in a limited number of eases, and that, while the
patient does not expect death, he knows it is a
possible eventuality. For example, one who submits to a simple appendectomy, where the condition is not acu:te, knows that he may be one of
a comparatively small number who will die as a
result of the operation. He does not expect death,but he knows it may occur. In such cases, we do
nol think an ordinary man would say that the
death was accidental. Here, the insured was suffering from a chronic gall. bladder ailment. In
addition to that, his appendix was seriously involved. He was also suffering from parenchymatous degeneration of the liver and kidneys.
He was 62 years of age. We do not think that
the ordinary man, under the attending facts and
circumstances, where a major operation in the
upper abdominal cavity caus·ed a pulmonary collaps·e resulting in death, would regard the death
as accidental."
The reasoning of this case supports our contention
that the rule of the Handley case does not apply and
should not be extended to the facts and circumstances
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1nitted was not trival and the result was not unforseen.
The death of Kellogg resulted directly or indirectly from
physical infirmity or from illness or dis!ease. The decision of the Trial Court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submvttt.ed,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Atto1'neys for Respondent
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